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ARTICLES
Islamic Law: The Impact of
Joseph Schacht
David F. Forte*
For a little over a century, Islamic law has suffered progressive
shocks and disruptions at the hands of modernism. Muslim legal
scholars in Middle Eastern states and elsewhere have seen their
sacred Shari'a restricted, modified, distorted, or simply replaced by
modern Western legal codes.' The reforms began in a piecemeal
fashion, but recently, there have been wholesale importations of
foreign law.2 Both Westerners and reformist Muslims have conceded
that the very nature of Islamic law and its consequent rigidity have
made much of it irrelevant to modern society. 3 The reform, though,
has not been unopposed. Throughout Islam, traditionalist groups
constantly rise in an effort to restore the Shari'a to its "rightful
place" in the legal order. Some of these groups represent a threat
to the legitimacy of modern regimes.'
Many learned Muslims were unhappy with the imposition of
the modern codes. But worse was to come. Already buffeted by the
trends of Western legalism, Muslims found themselves faced with
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, College of Law.
This paper was read before the Seminar on Law and Religion of Antiquity sponsored by
the National Endowment for the Humanities and held at the University of California School
of Law (Boalt Hall) at Berkeley, June 26 - August 4, 1978. The author is indebted to the
director of the Seminar, Professor David Daube, for his comments and suggestions, and is
also grateful to Professor Noel Coulson for his comments on the paper. The opinions expressed
herein remain, of course, those of the author.
1. See generally Schacht, Islamic Religious Law, in THm LGAcy oF ISLAM 393 (J. Schacht
and C. Bosworth eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Islamic Religious Law].
2. See generally J. ANDzRSON, LAw Ruowm IN THE Musm Womw (1976) [hereinafter
cited as LAw Ruroim]; J. ANDERON, IMAWC LAw INTM MODERN WosLw (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Is&AMc LAw]; Bonderman, Modernization and Changing Perceptions in Islamic
Law, 81 HAtv. L. Rov. 1169, 1177-89 (1968).
3. S. V sv-Frrzzomm, MUHAmmADm LAw 8 (1931); Kourides, Traditionalismand Modernism in Islamic Law: A Review, 11 Cowii. J. TASNNAT'L L. 491, 497-505 (1972).
4. In Egypt, President Anwar Sadat must contend with right-wing religious groups which
desire to return to the fundamental principles of Islam. See F. ZuDE, L.Awy s, Tm RuLz
OF LAw, AND Limumm N Mozmw Eowr 146-47 (1968); Forte, Egyptian Land Law: An
Evaluation, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 273-74 (1978). Opposition to the Shah of Iran's modernization
program comes from diverse groups which "have allied themselves with the Mullahs, or
clergy, of the conservative (Shi'ite) sect that dominates Iran." N.Y. Times, June 4, 1978, §
1, at 1, col. 3.
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an even more serious challenge to their principles. From the pen of
the proverbial academic scribbler came an analysis which undermined one of the most fundamental bases of Islamic law. In the
1950's and 1960's, Joseph Schacht published the results of his researches into the Traditions of the Prophet. 5 Until his death in 1969,
Schacht insisted that his conclusions only confirmed the original
hypothesis of Ignaz Goldziher and the independent investigations of
Schacht's contemporary, Professor Brunschvig.6 Goldziher's views,
though, were substantially ignored, while Schacht, not Brunschvig,
is considered the true author of this historic revision.
If Schacht's views are correct, then a fundamental rethinking
of Islamic law is in order. And if Islamic Law is to be rethought, then
Muslim society itself may be in for a watershed change. Islamic law
is not merely one aspect of Muslim civilization. Rather, it is the
acknowledged crown of Islamic society, the queen of Islamic sciences. It is "the epitome of the Islamic spirit, the most typical
manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the kernel of Islam itself."7
What theology is for the Christian, law is for the Muslim." Despite
the internal variations in interpretation, Islamic law has been the
factor which has made that religion into a world-wide social force.
In its classic formulation, it continues to encompass nearly all aspects of Muslim life.'

I.

CLmsicAL THEORY OF IsLAMc LAW

Muslims regard the fundamental sources of Islamic law as divine in origin. The law provides the vehicle for transmitting the
5. J. SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIc LAW (1964) [hereinafter cited as
INTRODUCTION]; J. SCHACHT, THm ORIGINs oy MUHAMADAN JunismuDENCE (1950) [hereinafter
cited as OoiGiNs]; Islamic Religious Law, supra note 1; Schacht, Modernism and Traditionalism in a History of Islamic Law, 1 MiDDLE EAsr STuD. 388 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Modernism and Traditionalism]-, Schact, Pre-Islamic Background and the Early Development of Jurisprudence, in 1 LAW iN ThE Mmmz EAsT 28 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny eds.
1955) [hereinafter cited as Pre-IslamicBackground]; Schacht, Foreign Elements in Ancient
Islamic Law, 32 J. Comp.LUG. & INT'L L., 3d ser.,
9 (Parts I & IV, 1950) [hereinafter cited
as ForeignElements].
6. Modernism and Traditionalism,supra note 5, at 388. Goldziher's theory of the Traditions of the Prophet is found in 2 I. GoummmR,MUSUA STmuns 17-251 (1966).
7. Pre-Islamic Background, supra note 5, at 28. See also H. Gina, MoHAMMEDANism 7-8
(2d rev. ed. 1970); Islamic Religious Law, supra note 1, at 392.
8. See generally W. Samrri, IsLAM IN MoDERN HIm
57 (1957).
9. Coulson, Islamic Law, in AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL Sya'raa 54 (J. Derret ed. 1968).
J. N. D. Anderson notes that "personal and family law. . . together with the rules of ritual
and religious observance, has always been regarded as the very heart of the Shari'a." IsLonc
LAw, supra note 2, at 15.

1978]

Islamic Law

message heard by Mohammed to present day believers. 0 The
Shari'a comprehends all rules textually derived or analytically deduced from divine legislation which regulate the Muslim and his
community. Of the four main sources of the Shari'a ' - the Qur'an,
the Sunna (the practice of the Prophet), ijma (consensus of the
community), and qiyas (analogical deduction) - the Qur'an and
the Sunna provide the fundamental basis for the commands of the
Shari'a. 2 The Qur'an and the Sunna are the twin cornerstones upon
which the whole ediface of Islamic law is constructed. Together,
3
qiyas and ijma produce the bulk of the actual positive rules of law,'
but both techniques can only be based on the commands of the
Qur'an or the Sunna and cannot produce regulations in contradiction to those two sources.
All Muslims accept the Qur'an as the primary and direct source
of divine law. The Qur'an, however, is not a code of laws; its legal
component is relatively small. Out of approximately 6300 verses,
only 600 deal with legal issues.'4 In toto, there are around 240 legal
prescriptions in the Qur'an.'-'
The Qur'an embodies the divine law which "co-existed with
God Himself in a heavenly book, known as the 'Mother Book,' "'
written in Arabic from all eternity." As problems arose for Mohammed in his mission, parts of the Mother Book were revealed to
him. A few orthodox Muslim scholars cling to the belief that the
*Qur'an's legal prescriptions are totally divine and unrelated to previous legal custom,18 but it is clear from the content of the Qur'an
that Mohammed was attempting to reform much of pre-Islamic
Arabian law. Indeed, pre-Islamic Arabian law is the tablet on which
the Qur'an wrote a more highly developed moral and legal sense."9
10. See N. COULSON, CoNrMcrs AND TaNsioNs iN IsI.Aic Ju1USPRuDENCS 4 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as CoNucrs AND Talmom]. See generally S. MAHmAAI, Tm PmLosoPH oF JuszauD Ncz
IsLAm [FAIsArAT AL-TAmsu 1N AL-IsAm] 5 (1961).

11.
lims.
12.
13.
14.

This discussion is confined to the doctrines espoused by the Sunni (orthodox) MusH. GLSa, supra note 7, at 62-63.
LAw RzroRM, supra note 2, at 178.
N. COULSON, A HTORY o ImAMc

LAw

12 (1964) [hereinafter cited as HgrroRi]; L.

Mnuor, IhMRODCnON A L'Ermn DU Dnorr MusumMN 106 (1953).
15. S. RAh DAN, ISLAMIC LAw: ITs SCoP AND Equrrv 33 (1961).

16. Khadduri, Nature and Sources of Islamic Law, 22 Gzo. WASH. L. Ray. 3, 6 (1953).
17. IsLAac LAw, supra note 2, at 11.
18. S. HASSAN, THz RcoNmucnoN OF LaGAL THOUGHTiN ISL"A 21 (1974). This viewpoint is championed by the Shi'ite sect. LAw Riwom, supra note 2, at 10; Khadduri, supra
note 16, at 3; Robson, Tradition,The Second Foundationof Islam, 49 Must-n WoPw 22, 2526(1951).
19. A. RAIM, T PRICIPLES OF MUHAMMADAN JuRSPRUDENCR ACCORDING TO THE HANAJ,
MAnu, Smi M'l, ANIDHANBAU ScHooLS 1 (1963).
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Although it seems odd that the permanent Mother Book of divine
law should contain precepts of a highly parochial character, most
Muslim legists have accepted the view that pre-Islamic law forms a
large part of the Qur'anic legal order."
The second fundamental source of law is the Sunna of the
Prophet. "Sunna" is a term of pre-Islamic Arabia meaning "custom
of the community." ' 2' As applied to Mohammed, it means that Mus-

lims are obligated to follow what he did, what he said, and practices
which he tacitly consented to.22 Because God appointed Mohammed

as His messenger, Muslims regard the Sunna of the Prophet as
indirect divine revelation.2 3
Classic Islamic doctrine holds that for the first decades following the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D., the Sunna was followed
by Mohammed's Companions and Followers, who had an intimate
memory of what the Prophet had done.Y Few if any of Mohammed's
examples were written down.5' However, towards the end of the first
Islamic century, it became necessary to begin recording what Mohammed had said, done, or permitted to be done. These records
were called the "Traditions of the Prophet" (hadith, pl. ahadith).
Eventually, the ahadith became the only reliable means to determine what composed the Sunna of the Prophet."
Towards the middle of the second Islamic century, compilations of traditions began to appear. The early compilations contained relatively few traditions. The Muwatta of Malik (compiled
around 130-140 A.H.) for example, contains roughly 600 traditions,
reaching back to the Prophet. By contrast, a later compilation by
20. A= AHMAD, ISLAMIC LAW iN THzORY AND PRACSE 2 (1956); LAw RroRm. supra note
2, at 10.
21. H. Gins, supra note 7, at 73.
22. These are known as the Sunnat-al Qual, the Sunnatal Fit, and the Sunnot-al Taqrir.
S. MAHMAssAm, supra note 10, at 71; Axz Ammn, supra note 20, at 29. See M. Qunmm,
IsLAwc JumsPVuDzwc 40 (1970); AQL AmiAD, A Tzxr BOOK or MommADAN LAw 15 (4th

rev. ed. 1966).
23. G.H. Bousquvr & J. ScHAcirr, SL.uCmn WoRKs oF C. SNOuK HuRGRoNj 269 (1957);
Azmz AHiLD, supra note 20, at 29; M. QuRumas, supra note 22, at 12.
24. H. Gmu, supra note 7, at 50; A. Imwuu, IsLAwc LAw IN MALAYA 13 (1965).
25. There are conflicting reports. One traditional story holds that Mohammed forbade
the writing down of the traditions lest they be confused with the work of God in the Qur'an.
See S. MAmwASSAm, supra note 10, at 71. Another report states that the Companions actually
had some of the traditions burned. S. YAQuB SHAH, ISLAbOc JuiuSluDNcz iN THz LioFr oF
tm QuRNi AND SuNNAH 1A, 20 (1971). On the other hand there is the assertion that over 250
traditioni were inscribed in the Prophet's presence. See A. GULLAUMi,
THz TRADmoNs or
ISLAM 16 et. seq. (1924).
26. P. Hrm, IsLAM, A WAY OF Lire 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as IsLAm]. See A. HAsm,
THu EARLY DEvELoPMENT or ISLAMIc JUSPRuDENCE 49 (1970).
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Hanbal near the end of the second Islamic century included 50,000
traditions."
The traditions were written in the form of transmission, with
the most recent relator placed first, the source he received it from
next, then that source's source, and so on back to Mohammed. The
chain of transmission (called isnad) soon became the litmus test of
authenticity.
Faced with a burgeoning number of purported traditions, the
Muslim legists developed a special branch of study: "the science of
impugnment and Justification." 3 Hadith scholarship became the
highest form of Muslim learning." Using a number of criteria, the
jurists hoped to screen out authentic traditions from the apocryphal, for it became and continues to be a central tenet of Islamic
jurisprudence that authentication is not a matter of faith but of
human investigation and verification. The content of authenticated
traditions must be accepted as indirect revelation, but the process
of authenticating the traditions is purely human. This scientific
doctrine becomes a central point once we turn to Joseph Schacht's
recent researches.
The Muslim hadith scholars investigated the lives of those who
were transmitters to ensure that they were reliable and pious men.
They checked to see whether the isnad was continuous back to the
Prophet, or whether there was a gap. They sought traditions with a
number of parallel transmissions. As a result, the hadith scholars
developed certain classifications by which the strength of various
traditions could be determined. 3 All the orthodox legal schools of
27. M. Qumim, supra note 22, at 45.
28. H. Gmns, supra note 7, at 52.
29. P. Hrrn,HisToRY oy ma ARAws 393 (10th ed. 1970).
30. The classification regarding legal force falls into two groupings: those ahadith which
are the source of obligatory rules, and those whose derived rules are merely persuasive.
Traditions which have in their isnads many Companions and Followers are termed
continuous; those with few Companions and many Followers are called famous; and those
with only a number of Followers in the chain are designated isolated. Traditions may also be
classed as connected, with a continuous isnad; and disconnected, with a gap in the chain.
To be authentic, a tradition should meet various tests: 1) the tradition had to be present in
all three classic periods, that of the Companions, the Followers, and the followers of the
Followers; 2) a narrator had to be a Muslim, of sound mind, important, and possessing of
judgment, good memory, and good character; 3) narrations of famous persons were preferred,
as were narrations of jurists over non-jurists; 4) a narration had to be in conformity with the
Qur'an, the other parts of the Sunna, and the actions of the Companions; 5)the tradition
had to be plausible; and 6) an "innovative" tradition was invalid. M. Quzss, supra note
22, at 42-44. After all these tests were applied, the final classifications of the traditions
were in groups called sound, good, and weak. H. GNa, supra note 7, at 53. See also Robson,
Tradition:Investigation and Classification,49 MusLm Wonw 98 (1951).
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Islam accept the authenticated traditions as binding, but they differ
as to which isnadclassifications are sufficiently justified to be called
genuine.
By the third Islamic century, the final authoritative collections
were completed. The six collections were those of al-Bukari, Mus.
lim, Abu Dawud, al-Nasai, al-Tirmidhi, and Ibn Maja. AI-Bukari
reportedly sifted through over 200,000 traditions to select and categorize less than 3,000.1 Despite the pruning, however, those traditions still considered authentic form a very large number, and it is
from them that the great bulk of the rules of the Shari'a are derived,
by way of the interpretive devices of qiyas and ijma.32
Qiyas, as noted above, is the third source of Islamic law. It is a
structured method of analogy by which rules are applied to new
situations by reference to other previous rulings. It is a form of legal
reasoning common to all advanced legal systems. Although no rule
reached by qiyas may contradict a specific command of the Qur'an
or the Sunna, it does provide a more flexible method of coping with
new problems.
Ijma, on the other hand, has constricted the development of
31. H. Gma, supra note 7, at 54.
32. Many traditions refer to religious practices. For example, Gibb reports one as follows:
Uqba ibn Amir said 'Someone sent the Prophet a silk gown and he wore it during
the prayers, but on withdrawing he pulled it off violently with a gesture of disgust
and said "This is unfitting for Godfearing men."'
H. Gma, supra note 7, at 51.
Others are strictly legal, as for example the famous hadith limiting bequests to one third:
Sa'd bin Waqqas said: 'The Messenger of Allah used to visit me at Mecca, in the
year of the farewell pilgrimage because of my illness which had become very severe.
I said: "My illness has become very severe and I have much property and there is
no one to inherit from me except a daughter. Shall I bequeath two-thirds of my
property to a charity?" He said: "No." I said: "Half?" He said: "No." Then he said:
"Bequeath one-third and one-third is a great deal, because if you leave your heirs
free from want it is better than if you leave them in want, begging of other people
NY,THi LAw or Tm NEz AmD MmmE EAST 181-82 (1975).
Some relate to the character of the times with a content both poignant and tragic:
Bukari [there follows a long chain in the isnadl from Ibn Umar: "They brought
the Prophet, on whom be God's benediction and peace, a Jew and a Jewess who
had committed fornication. He said to them: "What do you find in your book?"
They said: "Our rabbis blacken the face of the guilty and expose them to public
ridicule." "Abdallah ibn Salam (who had been a Jew) said, 'Messenger of God, tell
the Jews to bring the Torah.' They brought it, but a Jew put his hand over the verse
which prescribes stoning and began to read what came before it and after it. Ibn
Salam said to him 'Raise your hand,' and there was the verse about stoning beneath
his hand. The Messenger of God gave the order, and they were stoned." Ibn 'Umar
added: "They were stoned on level ground and I saw the man leaning over the
woman to shield her from the stones."

Quoted in H. I m

Quoted in J. Wnwiams, IsLAM 82-83 (1961).
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Islamic law. Ijma, or consensus of the scholars, is of very high and
perhaps controlling authority, but there is disagreement among the
schools both as to the scope of consensus which is required for iima
and the permanence of the rules thus derived. Muslims variously
hold that the consensus is needed only among the scholars of a
particular school, or legists, or legists of an early era, or the Companions, or scholars in general, or the entire Muslim community.
Whether the consensus needs to be unanimous to be valid and
whether the unanimity requires the explicit consent of all involved
is also debated.3
One important view of ijma is that once consensus is achieved
there can be no more dispute concerning that rule. Thus, by the
tenth century A.D., most of the great thinkers of Muslim jurisprudence had agreed upon the fundamental rules of the Shari'a and
further legal speculation was no longer permitted. This conception
of ijma has been a great hindrance to the subsequent development
of Islamic law.s
Additionally, ijma can be used as a separate method for authenticating the Traditions of the Prophet. According to this view,
if the legal scholars of a given generation agree on a point, their
judgment is regarded as infallible. Thus, the fact that there was
general acceptance among the schools of most of the traditions contained in the great compilations signifies that the traditions are
authentic.3s Unfortunately, the authority for this concept of ijma
itself comes from a tradition. Mohammed reportedly declared,
"[mly community will never agree on an error.' ' x The reasoning,
of course, is circular. Indeed, if research casts doubt on the validity
of the traditions, then this view of ijma must necessarily lose its
authority as well. In fact, Schacht declares that ijma was derived
37
from the Roman law tradition of opinio prudentium.
33. See F. Zuwz, supra note 4, at 118; see generally K. FABuKI, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
68 (1962); D. MUA & M. HADJAwTuLA, PwiampzsS or MASoM=)AN LAW xxii (16th ed.
1968); AQL ANMAD, supra note 22, at 17; Am ANMAD, 8upra note 20, at 43.
34. H. Gina, supra note 7, at 66. Modern Muslim reformers find ijma one of their greatest
obstacles. H. Gina, MoDERN TmeNne IN IsLAm 13 (1947) [hereinafter cited as MODERN

TEMm).

35. P. Hrrn, HTrORY or Tiz ARAs 399 (10th ed. 1970); ISLAMc LAw, supro note 2, at
13-14. However, Anderson elsewhere asserts that Western students of Islam regard ijma as
"fundamental" while Muslims grant primacy to the Qur'an and the Sunna. LAw RiwoRM,
supra note 2, at 6 n.7.
36. HITRY, supra note 14, at 77; 2 I. Gowzumt, supra note 6, at 88; see L.Aw RaroRm,
supra note 2, at 6 n.7.
37. INTRODUCTON, supra note 5, at 20. There are, of course, supplementary sources of
Islamic law recognized by various schools. They include istihsan, hallmark of the Hanafi
school, wherein the application of equity is used to reach a just solution to problems which
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According to classical Islamic law, there was no historical development of the fundamentals of the Shari'a. The "law" was divine
in origin, given by God through Mohammed in the Qur'an and the
Sunna. The major precepts were known at the death of Mohammed.
None were added afterwards. All that Islamic jurisprudence did was
to authenticate the already given divine commands, and to deduce
from them their logical implications.
Thus, the four Caliphs who succeeded to the leadership of Islam
after the death of Mohammed (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali)
applied the Qur'an and their remembrance of the Sunna of the
Prophet to legal problems. Following the death of Ali, in 40 A.H.,
the Muslim world was riven by a civil war. But within a brief period,
the Umayyads successfully gained the leadership of the Islamic
empire. At this point, the local schools of law began to develop, first
in the Prophet's city of Medina (under Malik) and later in Kufa
(under Hanifa).
In applying the Qur'an and the Sunna to the new situations
before them, the local jurists first used ra' (independent reasoning). Ra'y, however, led to diverse and conflicting results and it was
quickly supplanted by the technique of qiyas. In fact, ray was disparaged as engendering "innovation" in the divine law. Qiyas became the corrective for the subjective ra'y.
The schools of law also began the preliminary hadith compilations to help remember the Sunna. In a few years, two more schools
formed under the disciples of Shafi'i and Hanbal. Despite their
remaining differences, all of the schools joined in a movement to
reform the worldly Umayyads.
In the end, they succeeded in systematizing Islamic law and
purifying the traditions of false components. Their triumph was
completed in the middle of the second Islamic century, when the
Umayyads were overthrown by the more orthodox Abbasids, and
later in the third century when the final compilations of the traditions were written.
are not adequately covered by the other sources. In fact, istihsan allows for deviation from
precedential rules. Istislah, the famous principle of the Maliki school, allows for new rules to
be made in the public interest. Such rules are to be permitted only if the Qur'an or Sunna
has not made a definite statement of values applying to the case. Urf, or local custom, is
allowed in certain areas of territory and in certain legal matters where the Shari'a has left
the subject open. Istidlal is the use of logical inference when the strict rules of qiyas are not
sufficient.
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II.

SCHACHT'S HISTORIC CRITICISM

Joseph Schacht indicated that most of Islamic law, including
its sources, resulted from a process of historical development. '
Where classical Islamic jurisprudence claims that legal problems
were solved by recourse to the Qur'an, the Sunna, ra'y (later rejected), qiyas, and ijma in that order, Schacht asserts that the content of Islamic law followed a different sequence.
In capsule form, Schacht holds that first, during the period of
the Caliphate and in the early Umayyad empire, pre-Islamic custom
formed the bulk of the legal rules in Arabia. This was the traditional
"sunna" that the Arabs had lived under for centuries. At the same
time, local custom and the administrative rules of the Umayyads
were the law in the newly conquered provinces, creating a second,
parallel sunna. The law in Arabia and the provinces was structured
and developed by the newly forming schools of law, first through
ra'y, but mostly by consensus. The doctrines arising from the
schools formed a third sunna, called the living tradition of the
schools.
Soon thereafter, the schools began restructuring much of the
law by reference to the Qur'an. Finally, beginning around 100 A.H.,
the Traditions of the Prophet began to be fabricated. Eventually,
the traditions formed a new and final Sunna, which replaced the
pre-Islamic sunna of Arabia, the mixed custom-administrative law
sunna of the distant provinces, and the living traditions of the
schools. The unification of Islamic legal thought occurred under
Shafi'i, who raised the Traditions of the Prophet to a position of preeminence, second only to the Qur'an. Thus, the Qur'an (except for
a few early rules) and the Traditions of the Prophet were historically
the last authoritative ingredients in the formulation of Islamic law,
not the first.
Schacht's unsettling conclusion is that the Traditions of the
Prophet were a late invention and that few, if any, are authentic.
In fact, Schacht terms the development of the ahadith as an
"innovation, ' ' 39 perhaps the most anathematic word in Islamic legal

thought, signifying a purely human rule unconnected to the divine
source of law.
Expanding on his position, Schacht asserts that the "sunna"
which existed after Mohammed was the same "sunna" of pre38. The following summation of Schacht's position is taken passim from his writings,
note 5 supra.
39. ORIGINS, supra note 5, at 30.
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Mohammed Arabia, with only a few modifications dictated by the
Qur'an. Mohammed himself was not interested in changing much
of the traditional sunna. He was primarily concerned with reforming
religious practices. As the leader of Medina, Mohammed conducted
himself in the manner of the old arbitrators, or hakams, of Arabia:
judging cases on an ad hoc basis.'0 In Mohammed's case, Schacht
concedes, the role of the hakam was modified. The traditional
hakams did not formulate black letter law as such, but rather decided questions according to their understanding of custom. The
decisions of the Prophet, on the other hand, were to have precedential value." But Mohammed limited his law-giving function primarily to the question of religious duties: "lihe wielded his almost
absolute power not within but without the existing legal system; his
authority was not legal but, for the believers religious and, for the
lukewarm, political."12 Since Mohammed's primary mission was
religious, he "had little reason to change the existing customary
law.113 It must be presumed that decisions based on the traditional
law continued to be made by the ordinary hakams.
The Caliphs who succeeded Mohammed as the leaders of Islam
did not themselves become arbitrators. Instead, they appointed
hakams who continued to apply the existing sunna of Arabia, with
the exception of a few modifications taken from the Qur'an. The
Caliphs became administrative law-givers who devised regulations
for governing the newly conquered territories, while leaving the local
law of Arabia substantially intact. The division between religious
requirements and legal rules remained so explicit that even a number of the Qur'anic legal forms were ignored. For example, flogging,
not the Qur'anic requirement of maiming, was the penalty for thievery." Because the secular was separated from the sacred, the Muslims had no qualms in allowing the local custom of the conquered
provinces to supplement the administrative regulations as the law
for those areas.' 5 Where the phrase "sunna of the Prophet" was used
in the early years, it either had a theological, not legal, meaning, or
40. The hakams were also soothsayers, and Mohammed went out of his way to insist that
he was not just another diviner, but had a greater mission. INTRODUCnON, supra note 5, at
10. Nonetheless, when making pronouncements of his revelation, he affected the manner of
a hakam. M. GAUDEMOY-DMoMBYm, MusuM INsTrrtrroNs 62 (1950); H. Gins, supra note
7, at 24-25.
41. INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 10.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. Schacht's perception of Mohammed as a religious but not a legal reformer is
contested by Coulson. See p. 19 infra.
44. INTRODUcTION, supra note 5, at 15.
45. Id. at 19.
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it was designed to ground in the Qur'an the authority of the Caliphs
to make binding regulations. It was not a shorthand version of the
positive legal rules of the Prophet." I
With the end of the Caliphate of the Companions and the beginning of the reign of the Umayyads, the next stage in the development of Islamic law began. In the newly conquered territories, the
Umayyad governors appointed qadis to administer edicts and decide disputes. The qadis were a branch of the executive administration, and consequently, the corpus of the law they administered was
founded in Umayyad regulations. Here too the regulations frequently took into account the customary law of the provinces. Consequently, in the provinces the "sunna" was a mix of administrative
practice and local custom interpreted through the ra'y of the qadis,1
The qadis soon became specialists in law. They joined with
other scholarly and religious Muslims in regional centers throughout
the empire to begin the development of the schools of law. In the
early years of the second Islamic century, the primary schools were
centered in Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Medina and Mecca in Hijaz,
and in Syria. Kufa and Medina became the most important, particularly Kufa. Traditional Islamic history holds that Medina was the
first and most important school, because there the memory and
traditions of the Prophet were necessarily the strongest. Schacht's
researches indicate that Kufa was in fact more important, and that
many of the legal precepts of Islam developed there and only later
spread to Medina."
Kufa was a cosmopolitan center, swept by many intellectual
crosscurrents. As a result, many legal rules and procedures from
other systems were absorbed. It was there that the Roman law principle of "the consensus of the scholars" was transformed into ijma.'
Replacing ra'y, the consensus of the scholars became the basis upon
which the schools interpreted and reformed Umayyad administrative practice and local custom. The doctrinal development of the
schools grew. Replacing pre-Arabian custom and Umayyad regulations, the doctrines took on the form of a new, third "sunna," which
was called "the living tradition of the school." Communications
46. Id. at 17-18.
47. Id. at 24-26.
48. OmGINs, supra note 5, at 228; INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 29.
49. OmGINS, supra note 5,at 83; Schacht, The Law, in UNmT AND VARIETY IN MUSUM
CWmuZATION 71 (G. von Grunebaum ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as The Law]. Qiyas was
borrowed from the rabbinic heggesh, itself taken from Greek influences. Foreign Elements,
supra note 5, at 14.
50. IRMODUCTION, supra note 5, at 29-30.
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within the Islamic empire were exceedingly efficient, and methods
and doctrines quickly passed from school to school.
During this same period a strong religious movement arose
which opposed the secular excesses of the Umayyads. The reformers
sought to impregnate the empire with Qur'anic norms. The schools
were sometimes within this movement and sometimes without. But
because of the influence of the religious reformers, the schools began
to apply Qur'anic injunctions to legal pioblems more rigorously, and
thus the process of the legal Islamicization of the empire began."
The critical juncture in the development of Islamic law occurred around 120 A.H. "By a literary convention, which found
particular favor in Iraq, it was customary for an author or scholar
to put his own doctrine or work under the aegis of an ancient authority."5 2 Thus, the Kufans, followed in a few years by the Medinese,
falsely ascribed their new doctrines back to earlier jurists within
their respective schools. Soon, the process was extended further
backwards in time to include the alleged doctrines of the Companions. But once authority was sought by invocation of the names of
the Companions, it was inevitable that the temptation to ascribe a
view to the Prophet himself would become irresistible. The schools
in Iraq were the first to take the theological concept of the "sunna
of the Prophet" and apply it in a legal context.u
The religious reformers, however, were the real champions of
the practice, supporting their views by reference to "examples" of
Mohammed. Their reliance on this technique earned them the name
of the "traditionists," and they used their method to oppose distasteful legal doctrines of the various schools. Detesting both ra'y
and ijma, the traditionists wanted all legal rules to be derived from
the divine Qur'an and practices of the Prophet. In their religious
fervor, they did not shirk from fabricating traditions to aid their
religious reform of the secular law. The traditionists even developed
self-justificatory sayings of the Prophet such as, "[slayings attributed to me which agree with the Qur'an go back to me, whether I
actually said them or not."5 At first, the schools resisted the tactic.
Ultimately, however, they wound up copying the traditionists. Men
of faith themselves, the jurists defended themselves by circulating
traditions which supported their own viewpoints. Yet by doing this,
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 26-27, 29; ORIGINS, supra note 5, at 191, 283.
Pre-Islamic Background, supra note 5, at 43.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 46.
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they recognized the final legitimacy of the Traditions of the
Prophet."
By the end of the Umayyad dynasty in 140 A.H., the process
of Islamicization of the law was virtually completed. 5 All that was
lacking was a systematizing of the result. Two schools (Kufa and
Medina) soon took on the names of their most famous jurists (Hanifa and Malik), while the other regional schools fell from sight. In
the last half of the second Islamic century, Shafi'i appeared. It was
he who accomplished the great systematizing of Islamic law through
an emphasis on the final authority of the traditions. Even the
Qur'an had "to be interpreted in the light of traditions, and not vice
versa."57 Shafi'i's theory so changed what had been the juristic values in the "living tradition of the schools" that Schacht terms it a
"ruthless innovation."58 The other schools accepted his scheme,
though they continued to differ on which ahadith were acceptable,
how they were to be interpreted, and what other sources were also
acceptable. His disciple, Hanbal, formed a fourth school, which was
even more insistent that the Sunna of the Prophet was determinative of proper legal rules.
After Shafi'i and Hanbal, the substance of most of Islamic law
was settled. The first three centuries of Islam had witnessed a dynamic development of the law. Pre-Islamic custom, Umayyad regulations, Qur'anic injunctions, foreign influences, scholarly interpretations and created traditions crashed against one another in a creative turmoil. Most scholars of that period were regarded as
mujtahids, persons capable of exercising ijtihad, that is, utilizing
reason to develop legal rules in light of the basic sources. But after
Shafi'i's time, the "gate to ijtihad" became closed. All the authoritative rules had been formulated. Ijma assured their authentication.
Although four schools survived the formulative period of Islamic law
and although their interpretations of the law have differences, each
regards the others as equally orthodox.
After about 1000 A.D., attempts to develop the law beyond
what the schools had done were regarded as tantamount to heresy.
In the stead of ijtihad came the doctrine of taqlid, which required
the faithful to obey without question the commands of pious men.
New legal thinking was abhorred. 5 9 A resultant lack of dynamism
55. INTRODUC ON, supra note 5, at 35-36.
56. Id. at 55; Pre-lalamic Background, supra note 5, at 53.

57

INTRODUCTION,

58. Id. at 48.
59. Id at 69-70.

supra note 5, at 47
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permeated Islamic law and has continued to the present century.
There have been a few legal scholars of the first order who disregarded taqlid in their attempt to contribute to Islamic fiqh (the
science of jurisprudence), but in every case, they did so in the face
of great opposition.
Schacht uses a number of criteria to prove that most traditions
were created after 100 A.H. as devices to substantiate particular
points of view. First, all authentic early writings of Islamic law are
virtually devoid of any mention of traditions. Some early writers
even held that "every opinion not based on the Koran, is erroneous."0 Second, the early doctrines of the schools of law were
almost always traced (usually apocryphally) to an earlier jurist or
to the Companions, virtually never to the Prophet."
Most important, as Schacht declares, "[tihe best way of proving that a tradition did not exist at a certain time is to show that it
is not used as a legal argument in a discussion which would have
made reference to it imperative, if it had existed." 2 The obvious
objection to this criterion is that the discussants may not have
known of a particular tradition. But this objection has only limited
weight for three reasons. First, communications in the empire were
so good that doctrines and views spread easily and quickly from one
juristic center to another. Second, if indeed the society was so attuned to seeking the Sunna of the Prophet, it is unlikely that so
many traditions would have been lost or forgotten. Third, even if an
occasional tradition escaped the ken of a certain judge, nonetheless
Schacht's evidence remains overwhelming. There are simply
hundreds of examples in which the disparity between an early decision and a later tradition took place. The jurists who decided the
cases were among the most learned and pious men of Islam. It goes
beyond rational belief to think that these men would have been so
consistently ignorant of contrary actions by the Prophet.3
Ironically, under Schacht's analysis, those ahadith which are
the most secure under Muslim science are often the most suspect.
If a tradition had many parallel isnads, and was transmitted by
well-known and revered men, and it was still not followed in early
cases, then the conclusion that it was created at a later date becomes difficult to gainsay.
60. ORIGINS, supra note 5, at 141.
61. INTRODUCION, supra note 5, at 32; ORIGINS, supra note 5, at 21, 29.
62. ORIGINS, supra note 5, at 140.
63. For Noel Coulson's answer to this point of view, see pp. 19-20, infro.
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III.

THE

DEBATE OVER SCHACHT

Joseph Schacht's discoveries have engendered one of the most
vigorous debates about Islamic law in centuries. In general, Muslim
scholars are somewhat in disarray and uncertain of how to handle
Schacht's conclusions. Western scholars, on the other hand, have
been more amenable to absorbing Schacht's view into their own
studies in the field. But both groups contain critics as well as supporters. In fact, it is in the Western group of orientalists where the
stiffest challenge to Schacht is raised.
A. The Reaction of Western Scholars
Nearly all Western Islamic scholars agree that Schacht's evidence against the authenticity of the traditions is virtually unassailable." They believe he has confirmed the original hypothesis of
Goldziher. Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes is particularly frank.
Many of the traditions, he said, "are apocryphal and were invented
in the 8th century in order to justify innovations and tendencies
which were very foreign to the intentions of the Prophet."1 He admits that the mass of ahadith did more to expand Islamic law than
restrict it. The traditions were a better source than even the Qur'an
because they "could even be created out of nothing."" The Sunna
and the commentaries constitute "a mass of material to make capital out of, rather than an epitome of principles and rules of conduct.""
Herbert Liebesny finds that Schacht's revelations complement
Liebesny's own researches into the influence of non-Islamic legal
forms on the practice of Islamic law." J. N. D. Anderson similarly
holds that most of the traditions were, "beyond question, fabricated,"" and that Schacht has shown that the classical rendition of
Islamic law "is both idealized and oversimplified."1 0 Anderson's
64. See, e.g., A. GuuAusm, ISLAm 98-100 (2d rev. ed. 1956).
Philip Hitti is one Western scholar who accepts the classical theory of Islamic law even
though he notes Schacht in his bibliography. P. Hrr, IsLAM, supra note 26, at 186 (1970).

65. M. GAUDEMoY-DNomrYNaS, supra note 40, at 65.
66. Id. at 61.
67. Id. at 66.
68. In his edited volume, THs LAw op Tm NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 24 (1970), Liebesny
entites the section in which Anderson summarized Schacht's findings as "The Actual Historical Development." On his use of Schacht's contributions see, e.g., Liebesny, Comparative
Legal History: Its Role in the Analysis of Islamic and Modern Near Eastern Legal
Institutions, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 38, 41-43, 48 (1972).
69. ISLuaC LAw, supra note 2, at 12.
70. LAw RFoRm, supra note 2, at 8.
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main concern is with the modern development of Islamic law. Consequently, he finds it "immaterial for our present purpose that modern scholarship has thrown the gravest doubt on the authenticity of
the whole corpus of traditions as they have come down to us." 7' He
is more concerned with the reformist movements in present-day
Islam. Yet it is Schacht's revelations which may hold the key to the
future development of Islamic law.
Seymour Vesey-Fitzgerald also agrees that "there was deliberate forgery of traditions by responsible lawyers on such a scale that
no purely legal tradition of the Prophet himself can be regarded as
above suspicion."" He attests that "[tihe new evidence revealed
by Schacht's researches raises the strong suspicions of previous
scholars to the level of proof.

7' 3 But

Vesey-Fitzgerald hints that the

substance of the rules behind the false stories may have reflected
the views of Mohammed. However, even here, he suggests that
Mohammed did not intend any rigid formula. The traditions attempted to create "legal theory out
of what can hardly have been
7
more than administrative advice." '

Vesey-Fitzgerald also tries to explain how the Muslim hadithcritics could have been so wrong. Simply because a man would not
willingly lie does not necessarily mean that he is telling the truth,
he suggests. Time, distance, memory, and disputative pressures can
drastically distort a person's testimony. 7 This is an interesting psychological point, but it cannot explain how those "responsible lawyers" could have created such "deliberate" lies, as Vesey-Fitzgerald
says they did.
H. A. R. Gibb, having written and researched for so long, found
it difficult to deny Schacht, yet also found it hard to fit him into
the traditional scheme. Gibb's analysis parallels the suggestions of
Goldziher more than it incorporates Schacht.7 1When Gibb reviewed
Schacht's The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudencein 1951, he
first credited Goldziher with laying "the axe to the root of the accepted doctrine of the origin of Muslim hadith or Tradition.

' 77

In

71. Anderson & Coulson, The Moslem Ruler and ContractualObligations, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 917, 925 (1958).
72. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Nature and Sources of the Shari'a, in 1 LAw IN THE MMDLE EAST
85-94 (M. Khadduri and H. Liebesny eds. 1955).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 93.
75. Id. at 93-94.
76. Compare H. Gisa, supra note 7, at 57-59 with 2 I. GoLDzmaa, supra note 6, at 89144.
77. Gibb, Book Review, 33 J. CoMP. LEGIS. AND INT'L L., 3d ser., Parts Il and IV, 113
(1951).
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the review, Gibb seemed to acknowledge the accuracy of Schacht's
findings. He wrote that the book "will become the foundation of all
future study of Islamic civilization and law, at least in the West,"
and that Schacht's "main structure is not likely to be impugned on
any but a priori grounds." '
Nonetheless, Gibb's later revised writings show a continued
hesitancy to embrace the full implications of Schacht's thesis. He
accepts, apparently on a priori grounds, at least part of the classical
Islamic view that a detailed concern for what the Prophet did permeated the first century of Islam, particularly among the Muslims
of Medina." He flatly contradicts Schacht's theory that Mohammed
confined his authority primarily to the religious side of life.
[Law] was the practical aspect of the religious and social doctrine
preached by Mohammed. For the early Muslims there was little
or no distinction between 'legal' and 'religious.' In the Koran the
two aspects are found side by side, or rather interwoven one with
the other, and so likewise in the Hadith. s
Using gentler language than Schacht, Gibb concedes that as Islam
developed under new philosophical and social pressures, "the figure
of the Prophet was continually readjusted to the new ideas and
ideals." ' Further, Gibb acknowledges the artificiality of the isnad
process as a means of authenticating the traditions. Yet he declines
to reach the same conclusion as Schacht did: "some European critics have argued for a more or less radical rejection of the whole
system as an artificial creation of later Muslim scholasticism. But
this is to go too far. 8' 2 Gibb suggests instead that Arab cultural
tradition has imprisoned the debate over the substance of religious
78. Id. at 114.
79. H. Ginm, supra note 7, at 50.
80. Id. at 61.
81. Id. at 23.
82. Id. at 56.
W. Montgomery Watt echoed Gibb's assessment when he wrote, "[in its broad outlines, the theory of Schacht appears to be justified, though in places he may have worked it
out too radically." W. WAIt, THE FoRMArvE PERIOD OP IsLAMic THOUGHT 66 (1973). Watt
accepts Schacht's view that the living tradition of the ancient schools was a form of sunna
reflecting the "idealized practice" of the early Muslims. Further, he admits that the doctrines
of the ancient schools were opposed by the party of Tradition which created isnads reaching
back to the Prophet. Id. at 256-57. Yet Watt believes that early Muslims "were aware of the
spirit in which Muhammed in his decisions had tried to fuse together Arab custom and
Qur'anic principle." Id. at 65. Furthermore, although there was no early systematic transmission of the Traditions of the Prophet, Watt insists that "[alnecdotes were certainly passed
on." Id. at 68. For a more complete exposition of a similar viewpoint, see the criticisms of
Schacht by Coulson at p. 19 infra.
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beliefs into the device of the hadith. Although the hadith scholars
were later able to weed out thousands of fabricated traditions by
means of testing the isnad, they always realized that it was a screen
for the substance of what lay beneath.8 Consequently, Gibb looks
upon the ahadith not as a fiction, but as a means to reflect in a
"documentary" fashion the realities of Islamic belief.8'
By this method of analysis, Gibb hopes to rescue the bulk of the
Shari'a from being construed as a total juristic contrivance. Yet he
does not deny what Schacht has demonstrated, viz., that the Traditions of the Prophet cannot be a valid documentary source for what
the Prophet actually did.8 And for the orthodox Muslim, only the
authenticated actions of the Prophet can be a basis for the Sunna.
Noel Coulson has expanded on the suggestions of VeseyFitzgerald and Gibb by directly confronting Schacht's conclusions.
In doing so, he triggered a reaction by Schacht, who likely had been
irked by the hesitant and largely undocumented criticism of his
theory by Western scholars. Since Coulson's view represents the
most developed challenge to Schacht, it is useful to consider it in
detail.
To begin with, Coulson admits from the outset that "the thesis
of Joseph Schacht is irrefutable in its broad essentials and that the
vast majority of the legal dicta attributed to the Prophet are apocryphal and the result of the process of 'back-projection' of legal doctrine .

.

.

."8

At the same time, Coulson suggests that the admit-

tedly fabricated traditions may have represented in substance the
rules of law the Prophet actually promulgated while at Medina."
Where the legal rule enunciated clearly represents an advanced
stage in the development of the doctrine, or where it concerns
problems which cannot have faced Muslim society until well after
the death of the Prophet, the presumption of falsehood is overwhelming. But where

. . .

the rule fits naturally into the circum-

83. H. GIns, supra note 7, at 56-57.
84. Id. at 58-59.
85. However, some of Gibb's language indicates a lingering belief that even the false

traditions reflected to some degree Mohammed's actual teachings. In his assertion that the
ahadith have documentary value, he says:

[tihe study of the hadith is not confined to determining how far it represents the
authentic teaching and practice of Mohammed and the primitive Medinian community. It serves also as a mirror in which the growth and development of Islam as
a way of life and of the larger Islamic community are most truly reflected.
[Emphasis added.]
Id. at 58.
86. HISTORY, supra note 14, at 64.
87. Id. at 64-65.
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stances of the Prophet's community at Medina, then it should be
tentatively accepted as authentic .... s
Generally speaking, the traditions are only a fictionalized illustration of the underlying reality of what occurred at Medina. Coulson
advances a number of propositions to show how something proven
to be false when written down in the second century A.H. could
nevertheless be a true reflection of events that took place well over
one hundred years before.
Between the time of the death of Mohammed and the rise of
the schools, some legal rules had to be applied, Coulson argues.
Otherwise, "a void is assumed, or rather created, in the picture of
the development of law in early Muslim society.""5 The Qur'an was
not a dead letter. Mohammed and his successors must have had to
contend with the new legal as well as religious problems the Qur'an
posed to traditional Medinan society.
Schacht's "void," however, was not without legal content. He
concedes that the Qur'an was applied to areas of inheritance and
marriage, but that other areas of the law were adequately covered
by the pre-Arabian sunna, or later, by Umayyad practice and the
doctrines of the ancient schools. The society was also open to legal
forms taken from the conquered peoples. Only later did a general
Islamicization of the law take place by means of a broader application of the Qur'an."
In his analysis of the Sunna of the Prophet, Coulson suggests
alternative theories to Schacht's."' First, Coulson repeats the obvious objections that early judges may have been ignorant of a number of ahadith. But this, of course, cannot answer the hundreds of
discrepancies that Schacht builds up. Second, Coulson says that an
early judge may have known of a particular hadith, but might have
failed to draw the same conclusions from it that later judges did.
This hypothesis is more plausible, but again, it is hard to measure
it against the numerous direct contradictions that Schacht lists
between early practice and a later hadith on a similar set of facts.
It is unclear why Coulson raised these arguments. They are
easily countered by reference to Schacht's works. Nor are they logically necessary to Coulson's main point, viz., that even if a judge
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id. at 65. The "void" refers to questions "which were begged by the Qur'an itself and
cannot possibly have been ignored by the early rulers and authorities." Letter from Prof. Noel
Coulson to the author (June 21, 1978).
90. ORIGINS, supra note 5, at 224.
91. HISTORY, supra note 14, at 67.
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knew of a particular hadith, and had correctly interpreted it, "he
would not necessarily consider himself bound by it; for he lived at
a time when . . . the authority of the Prophet as the interpreter of
the Qur'an was by no means considered paramount or exclusive."' 2
Coulson asserts that a practice of the Prophet could have been
known and could have existed side-by-side with contrary rules for
over a century. It was only later when the actions of the Prophet
were regarded as divinely inspired and binding, that these rules
supplanted pre-existing contrary regulations. The fact that in their
writing, the ahadith were embellished with false biographical data
does not necessarily devoid them of their substantive authenticity.
The traditions were fabricated to illustrate what was already known
but not yet accepted to be the precedential rules of the Prophet.
Coulson has focused on a gap in Schacht's logic. The mere fact
that a tradition is apocryphal does not mean that the underlying
legal rule attributed to the Prophet is fictitious as well. This leaves
two choices: either presume that a rule underlying the fabricated
tradition is also false, unless alternative authenticating evidence is
offered; or presume that the fabricated tradition reflects a genuine
view of the Prophet, unless contradicted by other evidence. In opting for the latter, Coulson challenged a major implication of
Schacht's argument.
Schacht took up the challenge in a review of Coulson's book,
to which Coulson issued a reply.' 3 In the review, Schacht's style is
comparable to a professor correcting a term paper. Page by page,
he lists passages in Coulson's book in need of correction." He also
makes an oblique ad horninem evaluation when he writes, "Mr.
Coulson looks at Islamic law with the eyes not of a student of Islam
but of a modern lawyer,"'" to which Coulson replies that "it is plain
that Schacht does not write, or think, as a lawyer."' 6
Schacht's pedantry stemmed from a fear that the great studies
in Islamic scholarship of the past few decades would be unthinkingly cast aside. Justifiably, Schacht believed that Goldziher was
unfairly ignored by Islamic scholars for decades, and he was distressed that the implications of his own researches "have not always
92. Id. at 68.
93. Modernism and Traditionalism, supra note 5; Coulson, Correspondence, 3 MIDDLE
EAST STUD. 195 (1967) [hereafter cited as Correspondence].
94. Modernism and Traditionalism, supra note 5, at 396-400.
95. Id. at 390.
96. Corresondence, supra note 93, at 201. Coulson has also sharply contested much of
Schacht's theory regarding the Shi'ite sect. N. CoULSoN, SUCCESSION IN THE MUSLiM FAMLY
125, 127 (1971).
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been faced resolutely . . . ". He suggests that Coulson is trying
"to whittle . . . away" the results of Schacht's method, and he
terms Coulson's contrary propositions "fanciful." 8
In the review, Schacht calls "unthinkable" Coulson's proposition that Mohammed's specific legal rulings would not be considered binding by his successors." In reply, Coulson cites an example
of a tradition of the mid-second century A.H. which was "well attested" but which Malik and Abu Hanifa rejected. Coulson implies
that the two scholars rejected the tradition not because they believed it invalid but because they did not regard it as binding.'"
The crux of the debate between the two men centered around
a particular tradition attributed to the Prophet restricting bequests
to one-third. 0 ' The tradition states that a man on his death bed set
six of his slaves free, but that a Umayyad governor voided the decision and freed only two slaves, chosen by lots. Schacht holds that
death-bed manumission is a bequest in Islamic law, and that this
decision had all the earmarks of an "innovation." The Umayyad
ruling therefore is the source of the general Shari'a rule limiting
bequests to one-third of a deceased's estate.101 Later, the six slaves
tradition was spuriously ascribed back to the Prophet. Some further
time afterwards a new tradition appeared (the tradition of
Waqqas), Ic wherein the Prophet himself required a dying friend to
limit his bequests to one-third. Coulson asserts that the Waqqas
tradition accurately reflects the original ruling of Mohammed and
that the decision of the Umayyad governor merely extended the
ruling to gifts made in contemplation of death. For Coulson, the
Umayyad action was not the source of the rule, but only an application. 1 1 Schacht brands this kind of analysis as "indeed projecting
doctrines backward with a vengeance, and Mr. Coulson shows himself more credulous than the traditionists of the third century of the
hijra who at least rejected traditions with isnads which they considered spurious."'0
The two scholars bolster their separate arguments by collateral
evidence. Schacht notes that the limitation of bequests to one-third
97. Modernism and Traditionalism,supra note 5, at 389.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 395.
100. Correspondence, supra note 93, at 197.
101. ORmINS, supra note 5, at 201-02.

102. Id. at 201.
103. This tradition is quoted at note 32, supra.
104. Correspondence,supra note 93, at 198.
105. Modernism and Traditionalism, supra note 5, at 392.
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benefitted the fiscal policies of the Umayyad administration'0 and
is only one more instance of the habit of the Umayyads to set onethird as an arbitrary limit for payments in many other contexts.'1
Coulson counters that the state would only benefit from this rule if
there were not enough heirs to exhaust the estate (an unlikely occurrence in an extended tribal structure). In addition he states that
the one-third rule in other Umayyad regulations applied to areas of
tax and public law, and not to subjects of private law.'" Schacht
further argues that the context of Umayyad regulations makes the
origin of the one-third rule plausible, whereas if the one-third rule
was part of Medinan society (of which almost nothing is known)
then it should be expected to be in the Qur'an, which treats legacies
in great detail.' 0 ' But Coulson disagrees again. He claims that the
Qur'an is not particularly encyclopedic on the rules of succession
and consequently this would be precisely the kind of problem the
Prophet would have been called upon to solve."10
Schacht puts forward one last defense which Coulson chooses
not to counter. The Waqqas tradition is paralleled almost exactly
by an earlier tradition attributed to Umar, in which nearly word for
word, Umar finally allows a bequest of one-tenth. For Schacht, if
the traditionists casually changed the provenance of the story from
Umar to Mohammed, it seems an irresistible conclusion that they
likewise fabricated the new fraction to justify what had become
standard practice under the Umayyads and the schools."'
After Coulson's reply was published, Schacht did not continue
the debate. Regrettably, he died two years later, leaving the debate
unresolved. Despite the highly developed arguments from both
Schacht and Coulson, the result is the same: it simply is not known
if traditions ascribed to the Prophet fairly reflect his legal views.
The isnads are totally unreliable. Corroborative evidence is sketchy.
It must be decided on the basis of logical inference whether the rules
underlying the ahadith merit a presumption of validity despite the
dissimulation inherent in the vehicle.
The debate with Schacht helped Coulson flesh out his objections. He refused to accept the natural inference that if the story was
false, the rule underlying the story was also false. But there are
106. INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 24.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Modernism and Traditionalism, supra note 5, at 394.
Correspondence, supra note 93, at 199.
Modernism and Traditionalism, supra note 5, at 393.
Correspondence, supra note 93, at 199-200.
Modernism and Traditionalism, supra note 5, at 395.
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deeper implications to Coulson's alternative. His presumption of
validity encounters numerous problems.
First, there remains the vexing issue of the motives of the traditionists. Their consuming objective was to make sacred the secular
law of the empire. The struggle permeated the entire Islamic world
politically, legally and theologically. For the traditionist, the only
acceptable goal was to win the battle against the ancient schools
and against the practices of the Umayyads. Their point of departure
was adversarial; fabricating traditions was their weapon. It cannot
be said that they were simply articulating the remembered examples of the Prophet for the edification of all who might listen. The
traditionists' very abhorrence of the empire of the Umayyads likely
would have influenced them to construct doctrines as well as tales
of the Prophet. The invalidity of the ahadith was unmasked in the
very attempt to combat the "false" traditions.
The simplest means by which honest men sought to combat the
rapid increase of faked hadiths is at the same time a most remarkable phenomenon in the history of literature. With pious intention
fabrications were combatted with new fabrications, with new
hadiths which were smuggled in and in which the invention of
illegitimate hadiths were condemned by strong words uttered by
the Prophet."'
Whatever the need, the pious produced a hadith to satisfy it. If the
traditionists did not shirk from creating stories and isnads to justify
nearly all their opinions, then we can be justifiably suspicious of the
claim that the substance of their arguments reflect the views of the
Prophet, at least until some additional evidence is brought forward."3 Furthermore, when the traditionists came on the scene, the
concept of authority in the law was already juristic, as represented
by the ancient schools. In disputing some of the rules of the schools,
the traditionists had to find a superior juristic "authority" to
112. 2 I. GOLDZIHER, supra note 6, at 126-27.
113. As the 12th century Islamic historian Ibn Khaldun put it:

Since it is of the nature of tradition to incorporate false statements we must examine the causes which produce them. They are:
(a) attachment to certain opinions and schools of thought. Now if a man's mind
is impartial in receiving tradition he examines it with all due care so that he can
distinguish between the true and the false; but if he is pervaded by attachment to
any particular opinion or sect he immediately accepts any tradition which supports
it; and this tendency and attachment cloud his judgment so that he is unable to
criticize and scrutinize what he hears, and straightway accepts what is false and
hands it on to others ....
Quoted in A. GUILLAUME, supra note 64, at 20-21.
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counter the authorities the schools had falsely ascribed as the
sources of their doctrine. Considering the context of the legal debate, it is far more likely that the traditionists placed the Prophet
as the author of their own rules in order to beat the ancient schools
at their own game, and not because they had a genuine memory of
what he had actually done. Perhaps it was only a slip of the pen,
but Coulson himself conceded to Schacht the "back-projection of
legal doctrine," not the back-projection of biographical data."'
Second, Coulson suggests that if the substance of a tradition
could have fit in with Medinan practice at the time of the Prophet,
it should be accepted unless contrary proof is offered. The fact remains, however, that most of the legal rules the traditions were
designed to replace, as well as those they wished to affirm, could
also have fit in with Medinan practice. Standing alone, speculated
harmony with the practice of the Prophet's community does not
distinguish the traditions from alternative rules extant at the time
the traditions were created, or even between traditions circulated to
counter one another. The mere fact that the Prophet's name was
appended to one practice adds no weight. Of course, if the traditionists' rules had replaced rules proven to be forged by the schools or
by the Umayyads, then the contrast would make some sense. But
such a differentiation is difficult to make in most instances. A limitation of bequests to one-tenth can be as much in harmony with
Medinan practice as would the rule of one-third. During the vogue
of back-projecting rules to the Prophet, those in favor of the onethird rule (no matter where it originally came from) expanded one
tradition and distorted another to make the Prophet the author of
the rule. If adding the Prophet's name to a rule creates no validity,
and if the underlying practice and its disputed alternative both can
be harmonized with Medinan practice, then there is no logical basis
for Coulson's presumption of validity. Otherwise, we are left in the
untenable position of saying that whatever group was clever enough
first to append the Prophet's name to a tradition supporting their
point of view should be granted the presumption of validity.
Third, if the traditionists were falsifying stories about the
Prophet in their battle with the schools and the Umayyads, on what
basis may we presume that they nonetheless had an -accurate view
of what the Prophet actually established as a legal rule? The true
rule of the Prophet and the "remembered" rule may have been
different. Both may comport with Medinan practice. This is a criti114. HISTORY, supra note 14, at 64.
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cal link in Coulson's theory. Coulson suggests that the actions of the
Prophet were known and transmitted orally."5 This conjecture is
plausible considering the oral tradition which was part of Arab
tribal culture. However, even if we accept this assumption, there is
the question of what the Arabs may have chosen to transmit orally.
If Mohammed decided cases as a hakam on the basis of existing
sunna as modified by the Qur'an, there would have been little reason to remember and transmit his "rulings" for, as Coulson insists,
Mohammed's rulings were not regarded as precedentially binding
either by his contemporaries or by his successors for well over a
century. Granted that the remembrance of the actions of the great
Prophet might have been important to the Arabs, it is far more
likely that his actions would have been remembered with more accuracy than his legal rulings: the tale more than the legal formula.
But Coulson says the traditions represent precisely the opposite: a
falsification of the data to illustrate the remembered legal rule.
Finally, there are enormous implications for Islamic law in
Coulson's formulation. One might suspect that, outside of its intrinsic merit, Coulson may have put forward his exception to Schacht
as an attempt to save the corpus of Islamic law from being drastically undermined. But the sensibilities of devout Muslims are
not likely to be assuaged by Coulson's viewpoint. First, he suggests
that the acceptance of the Prophet's actions as indirect divine revelation did not occur until sometime in the second Islamic century.
In effect, he has called this fundamental aspect of Muslim theology
a latter-day innovation. Second, his solution may be even more disorienting to the Muslim who is seeking a solid basis for the sources
of the Shari'a. If we know that the isnad criteria for authenticating
traditions are invalid, what are we to do with the thousands of
rejected traditions, uncounted numbers of which contradict the accepted traditions? As Goldziher wrote, "[e]very stream and
counter stream of thought in Islam has found its expression in the
form of a hadith, and there is no difference in this respect between
the various contrasting opinions in whatever field.""' Likely as
many, if not more, rejected traditions could have meshed with Medinan social practice just as much as the accepted traditions.
If Coulson is to presume the accuracy of the accepted traditions, he must also grant an equal presumption to the far greater
number of rejected traditions. Since the isnads provide no basis for
115. Id. at 65.
116. 2 1. GOLDZIHER, supra note 6,at 126.
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distinguishing between contradictory traditions, and since contradictory traditions can plausibly fit in just as well with Medinan
practice, the conclusion is forced that, at its present stage of articulation, Coulson's solution provides no basis for granting a presumption of validity to the accepted traditions and not to the others. The
formula lacks trenchency.
B.

The Reaction of Muslim Scholars

Since Schacht's publications, a great many tracts of Islamic
law have been. published in the Muslim world. Generally, Muslim
scholars have been unable to absorb Schacht's findings. Their perception of law remains juristic, not historical."'
A survey of the literature reveals that there have been varied
reactions to Schacht's discoveries. Some Muslim legal scholars simply ignore Schacht or wish him away. They place him in the same
limbo which Goldziher was in for so long. These writers do not face
the implications of Schacht's theories, even though they may cite
Schacht on another subject, or include him in their bibliographies.,"
Others treat Schacht as some kind of poacher on restricted
ground. For example, Said Ramadan writes that anyone who has
not spent his life as a specialized hadith-critic (i.e., no Westerner)
can ever make a valid criticism of the traditions. Ramadan claims
that only "profound study" of the traditions can lead to understanding, and not Schacht's "calculations of probability.""' The fact is,
however, that the entire Muslim science of hadith-criticism is
based on calculations of probability. In its terms, a tradition is more
likely to be authentic if its transmitters are pious men, if there are
many Companions in the chain, if there are parallel chains, and so
on. Traditions are even ranked according to probability of authenticity.1'0
A number of other writers seemingly accept Schacht, but at the
same time refuse to alter the classical theory. Anwar Ahmad Qadi,
for example, reiterates Schacht's interpretations but still asserts
117.

ISLAMIc LAW,

supra note 2, at 6-7.

118. See, e.g., M. QumSH, supra note 22, at 9, 24, 48; S. ABDz.-WAHs, AN INIRODUCMON
To IstAmic JURISPRUDENCE 59 n.10 (1963). See also Kemal Faruki's support of the efforts of
modem historical scholarship to investigate the validity of the ahadith, while still ignoring
Schacht. K. FARUKi, ISLAMIc JURISPRUDENCE 58 (1962). Cf. M. Qupmsm, supra note 22, at 22,
55.
119. S. RAMADAN, supra note 15, at 40. Ramadan also brands Schacht and other Westerners as "confused" for not realizing that the Sunna was written down in a later period to
combat schism. Id. at 35.
120. See note 30, supra.
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that the traditions are valid and go back to the Prophet. 2' He writes
that the hadith "is the best, most useful reliable source of our
knowledge of the Sunna."'2
On the other hand, some Muslims have sought to contest
Schacht directly. Ahmad Hasan, in his major work on the subject,'2
declares: "[t]he view that the law of Islam is purely based on the
popular practices of the Ummayyads, and does not take its thread
from the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet is contrary to facts
and untenable."''
Although Hasan claims to modify traditional Islamic theory
where the facts require it,'2 his work is essentially an apologetic for
the classical view against encroachments of Western research. He
cannot abide, for example, Coulson's suggestions that Mohammed's
actions were not binding on the early Muslims.

2

Hasan's version posits that the Qur'an, the practice of the
Prophet, and the traditions, simultaneously and more or less harmoniously, established Islamic legal norms in the earliest years following the death of the Prophet (although admittedly its systematization did not take place until much later). There was no pre-Islamic
legal sunna operating unaffected by the Qur'an, the practice, or the
traditions. There were few early hadith, Hasan explains, because
the Companions preferred to follow their own memories of what the
Prophet had done. Sometimes, however, one of the Companions
would seek out a hadith before acting.' Thus the practice of the
early Muslim community became central: it reflected the spirit of
Mohammed's reforms.1n
121. A. QADRI, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD 34-35, 63 (1963).
122. Id. at 64.
In the revised version of his famous work on Islamic jurisprudence, Sobhi Mahmasaani
cites Schacht's Origins, but he does not change one part of the classical theory. S.
MAmassm, supra note 10, at 214. In discussing those malefactors who devised false traditions early in Islam, Mahmassani cautions:
But this should not be taken to imply, as a number of orientalists have alleged, that

every tradition should be considered false until the contrary is proven. The doctors
of the science of the traditions did not accept traditions uncritically . . . . [I]n
their search for chains of authority, accuracy and trustworthiness, they had established a scientific and truthful criterion which made the study in this field reliable

and trustworthy.
Id. at 76.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

A. HASAN, supra note 26, at 12.13.
Id. at 29 n.17. The assertion, of course, overstates Schacht's position.
Id. at xv-xvi.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 95.
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Only when the empire expanded greatly and a sure contact with
the true Muslim practice faded under the Umayyads (and to some
extent under the schools) did the necessity for reliance on the
ahadith arise. As practice and the traditions grew apart, it became
necessary to find an alternative extrinsic means to verify the traditions. Hence the isnads came into play. Hasan denies that there
were wholesale fabrications, even though the isnad scholars rejected
most of the traditions that they scrutinized. True, some forgeries did
occur, but Hasan explains the phenomenon as resulting from the
deterioration of the morals of the Muslim community, the permission granted for the free transmission of hadith, and the rise of
heresies.'2 Hasan's view is that the newly articulated traditions
returned the Muslims to the true practice at the time of the Caliphate.
By positing a simultaneous early development of practice and
hadith, Hasan explains why the schools were more interested in an
idealized practice (the living tradition) and why they harkened back
to the Companions, rather than the Prophet. But Hasan's construct
does not sufficiently explain why the the ahadithwere so frequently
at odds with the living tradition of the ancient schools, why the later
traditions contradicted so much of earlier documented practice, and
how the traditions could have maintained such accurate integrity
when the conscious and explicit reliance on practice had gone so far
astray.
In the final analysis, Hasan defends the traditions against
Schacht by citing a few verses from the Qur'an,'0 by quoting sources
Schacht had already found to be apocryphal, 3 ' and by declaring
that he who disregards the good memory of the Arab race commits
"a sin against history.' 3 Schacht's conclusions are dismissed as
"mere conjectures" requiring far more explicit proof.'3
Another group of Muslim scholars have accepted Schacht,
though some have a few reservations. They evince understandable
129. Id. at 94.
130. Id. at 48.
131. Compare Hasan's version of an epistle written by al-Hasan of Basra, id. at 89, with
Schacht's evaluation, ORIGIs, supra note 5, at 229.
132. A. HAsAN, supra note 26, at 109, quoting Fazlur Rahman.
133. Id. at 90. See id. at 28 n.1, 159.
Syed Mahmud-un-Nazir also disputes Schacht, but in general he simply quotes authorities Schacht has determined to be apocryphal, or merely denies Schacht's views by a straight
counter-assertion. He too denigrates the implications of Schacht's researches as "mere conjectures." S. MAHMUD-UN-NAZIR, THE EARLY DEvELopMENT op IsLAMic JURISPRUDENCE 16, 30
(1973). The work of Syed Riazul Hassan follows a like pattern. S. HAsSAN, supra note 18, at
23.
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hesitation however, in applying the full range of his conclusions to
the body of the Shari'a. Majid Khadduri, for example, seems to
have no trouble adjusting to Schacht's historic analysis. He simply
acknowledges it as describing the way Islamic law developed and
leaves it at that. However, he does not draw conclusions as to what
this will do to the content of the traditional Shari'a.1u
Similarly, Asaf A. A. Fyzee finds Schacht persuasive. He affirms that "until the contrary is proved, we must assume that
[Schacht's position] is true."'" Fyzee does suggest two minor reservations. First, he thinks that even the fabricated ahadith represent
the developing usage of the Muslim community, and thus have
some relevance for determining the content of Islamic law (this is
similar to Gibb's view of the "documentary" value of the traditions).N Second, Fyzee suggests that the intense scholarship of the
hadith-critics could have uncovered some genuine traditions which
were not known to exist before.'1 Fyzee concedes that his reservations do not detract from the main thrust of Schacht's analysis but
he attempts to limit the impact of Schacht's thesis on the substance
of Islamic law. The classical theory, Fyzee concludes, has a certain
value for the lawyer, the historian and the student of civilization.
Schacht's "modem critical theory" on the other hand, "pays little
regard to ethical and spiritual norms." Though it has "scientific
value, . . . it cannot stand alone. A careful study of both theories
is essential for a modem, critical student of the law . . . ."13 Nowhere, however, does Fyzee give any indication of how the classical
and the modern theories can be harmonized.
Finally, there is the unusual work of Ahmad Ibrahim. 31 As with
many other Muslim scholars, his thesis is eclectic and lacks rigorous
consistency. He cites and accepts Schacht's theory, for example, but
still affirms many of the tenets of the traditional Islamic iewpoint.
He follows Schacht's version of the development of te ancient
schools, yet in places, he mirrors Hasan's scheme.110 He allows that
Mohammed's mission was primarily religious and not legal, and he
also admits that many of the traditions may not be historically
134. Khadduri, supra note 16, at 3-13; see also M. KHADDUPI, ISLAMC JUmSPRUDENCs 37, 37-38 (1961).
135. A. FYZE, OurnaS or MOHAMMEDAN LAw 27 (4th ed. 1964).
136. Id. at 19.
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id. at 31.
139. A. IRAumM, SOURCES AND DvmoPmrzw or ISLAMIC LAW (1965).
140. Id. at 67-69.
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accurate."' At the same time, however, he insists that the ahadith
are authentic, and that the Sunna is binding."2
It would be easy to place Ibrahim's thesis among the works of
other Muslim scholars who never rise above eclecticism. But there
is a thread in Ibrahim's work which indicates that he has taken the
first steps towards re-evaluating Islamic law in the light of the writings of Joseph Schacht. Ibrahim hints that the ancient schools of
law may have been truer to the original basis of Islam than were the
traditionists. Although in some passages he asserts that the traditions represented the values of the sunna of the early Muslims,
elsewhere he accepts Schacht's view of the dichotomy between the
traditionists and the learned men of the schools."8 He states that
the sunna of the regions and the schools had as "its starting point
the ideal Sunnah of the Prophet,"'" and that through the exercise
of ijtihad and ijma, this sunna grew creatively to meet the conditions of Islamic life. But the Party of Tradition was "impatient with
the slow moving but democratic ijma process, recommended the
substitution of hadith for the twin principles of ijtihad and ijma and
relegated these to the lowest position and severed the organic relationship between the two."" 5 The success of the traditionists stifled
the development of Islamic law.
Ibrahim does not shirk from criticizing the revered Shafi'i for
demanding "an agreement which left no room for disagreement.""'
By cutting himself off "from the natural and continuous development of doctrine in the ancient schools," Shafi'i relied on a "new
idea of the Sunnah as embodied in formal traditions.""' 7 The older
democratic and organic mode which "tolerates and indeed demands
fresh new thought" was replaced by a more "manufactured" and
"static" formulation." 8
Ibrahim does not develop his theory sufficiently, nor is his work
free from contradictions. But it is clear that he believes that Islamic
law would have been better off if it had been allowed to grow organically, applying the fundamental norms underlying the Qur'an according to the differing circumstances of successive ages, rather
than being iron-bound in the rigors of the ahadith of the third Is141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 14, 41.
Id. at 13, 109.
Id. at 14, 69, 56.
Id. at 18.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 64.
148. Id. at 18, 19.
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lamic century and in the subsequent interpretations of the Sunni
schools."'
IV.

JOSEPH SCHACHT AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE

When historic research showed clearly that the Qur'an was not
a separate piece of divine legislation, but contained a transformed
version of pre-Islamic Arabian law, nearly all Muslim scholars were
able to accept that fact. Why is it that they have had such difficulty
accepting Schacht's revision of the source of the Sunna, when they
could easily modify their perception of the Qur'an itself?.
Any reader who surveys recent Muslim legal literature cannot
help but notice the defensiveness which permeates most of the
works. Apparently, there is great fear for the integrity of the Islamic
legal tradition. Islamic scholars have been particularly proud of the
rigorous manner in which the classical technique of hadith-criticism
was conducted. Indeed, law was and still remains the master Muslim science.' It is understandable that when told that the hadithscholars had been missing the mark for so many centuries, a pride
ii a unique study was undercut. The irony is that Muslim science
has always maintained that authenticity is a human matter, and
that the efforts of independent investigation must be respected.'
The greatest fear of the Muslim legists is, however, that the end
of the authenticity of the ahadith will mean the destruction of the
greater part of the Shari'a. There is a fear that the work of the great
systematizers will collapse if the material they worked on is shown
to have been the creation of human minds. This fear is unfounded.
There is no reason to disregard the rules of law which have been
deduced from the traditions (or, more accurately, justified post hoc
therefrom). The fact that the ahadith have been used by the Muslim
community for so long, that so many great jurists have accepted
them and worked on them, and that they were created in an era of
religious reform, means that they need not be scuttled as if in conflict with the Qur'an. Even though the Sunna can no longer be held
to be a separate source of divine legislation, its role and history in
Islam means that it ought to continue to merit great respect.
It may no longer be the Sunna of the Prophet, but it remains
the Sunna of Islam, and, like the great principles of the English
149. Id. at 108.
150. H. GiB, supro note 7, at 7.
151. The orthodox Mahmassani respects the efforts of the Salafiyah school in Egypt to
review formerly accepted traditions on the basis of formal criteria. S. MAHMASSANi, supra
note 10, at 76.
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common law, should be held controlling unless substantial reasons
justify change. Thus, though the Sunna can no longer be considered
divine and unalterable, it still provides the bedrock for the Islamic
legal system.
Furthermore, the Islamic legal system itself contains the methods to ensure that any doctrine in the Sunna which needs to be
changed will be revised for only the most specific principled reasons.
The mechanisms of qiyas and a liberalized ijma can guarantee that
any reform of the legal content of the Sunna will be both gradual
and made only for good juristic reasons. Similarly, the devices of
istihsan, istihlah, and istidla'5 1 can be used more creatively to develop new law in deference to but not imprisoned by the human
inventions of the second Islamic century.
Islamic law possesses the tools not only to maintain respect for
the Sunna, but also to develop new rules of law from it and from
other principles. Schacht's views do not wipe away the relevance of
the Sunna, but they do provide a golden opportunity for principled
reform in Islamic law. Thus, the question returns. Why do not the
legists accept and use his discoveries in the traditional manner of
the creative period of Muslim scholarship?
The answer seems to be that Muslim legal scholarship remains
tied down by the doctrine of taqlid 5 Conservative legal elements
continue to reject any reform which may violate the norm of taqlid.
They steadfastly insist that society must "conform to the terms of
the divine law objectively determined."'5 To the Muslim locked
into a belief in the divine sources behind the ahadith,any wavering
on the Sunna "must undermine the very roots of the religious faith
itself." 55
Great Muslim minds, even some opposed to Schacht, continue
to rebel against taqlid and assert that ijtihad should be freed to do
its creative work once again. Anis Ahmad Siddiqi writes, for example, that ijma did not close the door to ijtihad and that it is in the
highest traditions of Islam to practice ijtihad.I" Rahim claims that
taqlid is not in harmony with the theory of Islam, 57 and Aziz
Ahmad, evincing the hope that the days of taqlid are numbered,
declares that the "law deduced by ijtihad changes and should
152. See note 37, supra.

153. Anderson, Modernization: Islamic Law, in
MODERNIZATION 73-75 (M. Brett ed. 1973).
154. CONFLICrS AND TENSIONS, supra note

NORTHERN AFRICA: ISLAM AND

10, at 112.
155. Id.
156. A. SIDDIQI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JUmSPRUDENCE 70 (1963).
157. A. RAHM, supra note 19, at 173.
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change in the circumstances and habits of the people."''
Even Said Ramadan, who is critical of Schacht, thinks that
taqlid has restricted new thought to what was already proclaimed
.by the schools. He calls for the emancipation of ijtihad from the
schools, though not in the direction that Schacht indicates, but
rather back to thinking solely on the principles of the Qur'an and
the Sunna.' "
Many Muslim scholars realize that under present limitations
imposed by taqlid, the Shari'a is simply irrelevant to coping with
contemporary legal problems. Fyzee, for example, suggests that law
and religion be separated so that modem legislation can proceed
without the restrictions imposed by the Shari'a.'" Such a separation
has been artificial in Muslim culture since the time of the traditionists, but the rigidity of the Shari'a forces modem scholars to opt for
it. On the other hand, Schacht asserts that Mohammed himself
made binding rulings primarily on religious, not legal matters.",
Therefore Fyzee's formula may comport more faithfully with the
practice of the Prophet.
Many defenders of the Shari'a prefer that modem legislators
not attempt to justify new reforms by a tortuous reference to the
Shari'a. They prefer that the sacred law of Islam remain unsullied
by modem reinterpretations.'" In their supposed protection of the
Shari'a, these scholars admit its modem irrelevance. Nor are they
without influence. Indonesian officials rejected a call for a new
ijtihad in their country."3 At an Islamic colloquium in Lahore in
1957, some delegates called for the withdrawal of a paper which
urged a new evolution of thought, and suggested ignoring some outdated Qur'anic texts.'" The rigidity of the Shari'a forced the Turks
- the earliest modem reformers in the Middle East - to abandon
it in favor of structuring a new code. During World War I the Turkish reformers despaired of the legists who could only quote traditions. "The Islamists," one reformer said, "explain simple matters
of common sense by quotations from the books of hadiths. What a
pity it is for men to believe themselves devoid of reason and depen158. Aziz AMMAD, supra note 20, at ii.
159. S. RAMADAN, supra note 15, at 64-73. See also A. HASAN, supra note 26, at 222-23;
A. IBRAHIM, supra note 139, at 109.
160. A. FvzEE, supra note 135, at 39.
161. See pp. 9-10 supra.
162. ISLAMIC LAw, supra note 2, at 24.
163. D. Lav, ISLAMIC COURTS IN INonsiA 238-39 (1972).
164. M. HALPERN, THE PoLmcs oF SocAL CHAoz IN Tm MmDL EAST AN) Nomm ARmcA

26-27 (1963).
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dent upon books of tradition on matters which are nothing but
simple matters of logic .

"I"In the 1930's Egyptian reformers

(including those who had enshrined ijrna) attacked the traditions as
spurious in their struggle to be free of the weight of the Shari'a.'"
The success of al-Sanhuri in modernizing the Egyptian legal system
lay in the very fact that he never made a rigorous theoretical justification for his reforms."' To do so would have meant confronting
classical Islamic theory in a battle he could not hope to win.
But the champions of renewed ijtihad are many. They include
the poet Iqbal, who pointed out that taqlid was turning the Shari'a
into a "fossil," and who wanted to free Islam from the stamp of
"Arabian Imperialism."'" He declared that the "closing of the door
of ijtihad is pure fiction.""' The nineteenth century reformer Mohammed 'Abduh, who doubted the authenticity of many traditions,
said that ijtihad was not only permitted, it was "essential."''"
'Abduh's renewed ijtihad had as its object the purification of Islam,
not its destruction. 1'
The defenders of ijtihad have always been present. They reach
back to Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328 A.D.) who ironically was a Hanbali,
the most hadith bound school of them all. 7 Their numbers grew in
the 18th century, when new interest was caused by the influx of
western culture, 73 and they continue to assert themselves in modern
times, when men such as Ameer All have declared that Islamic law
was in a state of:
stagnation ... principally due to the notion . . .that the right

to the exercise of private judgment ceased with the early legists,
that its exercise in modem times was sinful, and that a Muslim in
order to be regarded as an orthodox follower of Muhammad should
belong to one or other of the schools established by the schoolmen
165. N. BERKES, THE DEvELOPMRNT OF ScuLAJUsM tN TURKzY 384 (1964).

166. F. ZLADEH, supra note 4, at 118. Earlier, Abmad Safwat claimed as much right to

ijtihad as the third century scholars. Id. at 119.
167. M. HALPERN, supra note 164, at 126.
168. E. ROSENTHAL, ISLAM IN THE MODERN NATIONAL STATE 197 (1965).

169. Id. at 206. Other men, such as Ghulam Parwez followed Iqbal and rejected the
ahadith by limiting the Sunna solely to the Qur'an. Id. at 208.
170. A. HOURANI, ARABIC THOUGHT IN THE LmERAL AGE 1798-1939 147 (1970). See Anderson, Land Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950, in PoLmcAL AND SociAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYr
225 (P. Holt ed. 1968); M. KERR, IsLAMic RoRm 103-52 (1966).
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of Islam, and abandon his judgment absolutely to the interpretation of men which lived in the 9th century and who could have no
conception of the necessities of the 20th. 7 '
Two years after Schacht's The Origins of Muhammadan
Jurisprudence was published, the Council of the Academy of Islamic Studies in India circulated a "call" for a "reappraisal of the
corpus of hadith, with a view inter alia to a possible reformulation
of law."'' 5
In the main, the attempts at a renewed jurisprudence have
failed. Instead, reforms have taken place by the device of picking
and choosing between the schools, by siyasa (the "right" of executive regulation), by eclecticism, or by outright rejection of major
portions of the Shari'a. There has not been a "new ijtihad,"I but
rather an unsystematic borrowing from legal systems both within
and without Islam. The technique mirrors the practice of the early
Muslims when they had conquered new lands,'7 but it fails to approach the later systematic and analytical development of legal
conceptions which is the hallmark of true ijtihad. In the Middle
East today, the mixed nature of the law stands more as a rejection
of the classical Islamic legal heritage than a continuation of it.18
Henri Pirenne has noted that, unlike the Germans, the Arabs
did not adopt the faith of their conquered populations. They were
"exalted by a new faith,"' 7 9 and their beliefs took root. When later
peoples, such as the Turks, conquered the Arab lands, they did not
displace, but absorbed the Islamic faith. But this is not what has
happened in the twentieth century. Western law has invaded the
Muslim world, not to be "Islamicized," but to displace much of the
Shari'a. Taqlid and classical Islamic legal theory has been unequal
to the challenge of the West. A stubborn atavism is not a creative
response.
It is here where Schacht's service to Islamic law becomes most
salutary. He has made it possible for this great legal tradition to free
itself from an unthinking bondage to issues relevant to the second
Islamic century, and thus open anew the gate to ijtihad. Mujtahids
need no longer fear they are revising divine law when they develop
174. Quoted in D. MuuA & M. HiDAwjATuuAa, supra note 33, at xxviii. See also MODERN
TREmns, supra note 34, at 97.
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the traditional norms of Islamic law beyond the confines imposed
by taqlid. The Sunna of Islam remains the way of the Prophet's
devout followers, even though it may not be the way of the Messenger himself. In this fashion, respect for the Sunna and the authority
of its rules can continue, but as its source can no longer be determined to be divine, a principled and creative reform can take place
making the Shari'a once again a dynamic legal force contending
with the current problems of Muslim society.

